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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
TORTS-WRNGVUL DEATH-SUICIDE AS RESULT OF UNCONTROLLABLE
IMPULSE CAUSED BY NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED INJURIES.
Orcutt v. Spokane County (Wash. 1961).
On January 4, 1956, plaintiff's intestate was a passenger in an auto-
mobile which fell into a road washout, as a result of which she suffered
serious and painful injuries and was compelled to undergo surgery. On
October 13, 1957, plaintiff's intestate took her life by consuming an over-
dose of sleeping pills. In the interim, the decedent had consulted a neuro-
psychiatrist and had three times been thwarted in suicide attempts. Plain-
tiff administratrix brought a wrongful death action, alleging that decedent's
injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendant county in main-
taining the road where the accident occurred, and that decedent took her
own life as a result of an uncontrollable impulse caused by pain and
suffering resulting from those injuries. The neuro-psychiatrist who had
examined decedent testified in support of the latter allegation. The trial
court dismissed the action with prejudice on the ground that plaintiff's
evidence was insufficient to -show causal connection between the accident
and decedent's death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington with
four judges dissenting, reversed and remanded, holding that the evidence
raised a jury question as to whether decedent's suicide was a result of
an uncontrollable impulse resulting from a mental condition caused by
her injuries. Orcutt v. Spokane County, 364 P.2d 1102 (Wash. 1961).
The problem of the causal connection between a defendant's negli-
gence and the harm suffered by his victim is generally dealt with by
the courts in terms of proximate cause.' This is, in effect, a limitation
which the courts have deemed expedient, as a practical matter, to place
upon one's liability for the consequences of his acts, even though those
acts have actually caused harm to another.2 Recovery in cases where
suicide follows harm negligently inflicted upon the decedent is generally
denied on the ground that the negligence was not the proximate cause
of death in that the suicide was an unforeseeable and intervening cause.8
However, a defendant will be liable for the death of his victim if the
latter takes his life while in a mental state caused by his injuries, as a
result of which he either does not understand the nature of his actions
or their inevitable or probable consequences, or, realizing that his acts
will culminate in death, he is powerless to govern his conduct rationally
because of an uncontrollable impulse to take his life.4 This is, as even
1. PROSSZR, TORTS § 44 (2d ed. 1955).
2. North v. Johnson, 58 Minn. 242, 59 N.W. 1012 (1894).
3. Scheffer v. RR. Co., 105 U.S. 249 (1882); Cooper v. Mass. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 102 Mass. 227 (1869); Long v. Omaha Ry., 108 Neb. 342, 187 N.W. 930(1922); McMahon v. City of New York, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
4. Tate v. Canonica, 181 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1960); Elliot v.
Stone Baking Co., 49 Ga. App. 515, 176 S.E. 112 (1934); Brown v. American
Steel & Wire Co., 43 Ind. App. 560, 88 N.E. 80 (1909); Daniels v. N.Y. Ry. Co.,
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the dissenting judges in the instant case agree,5 the generally accepted case
law on this point and it agrees with the rule set forth by the Restate-
ment of Torts6 and the leading text writers.7  Although damages have
been awarded for suicidal death under workmen's compensation laws,8
and in situations involving the special duty owed to patients by hospitals,9
plaintiffs in negligence actions involving suicide in most cases have not
obtained favorable results, generally because the difficulty of establishing
proximate or legal causation is by no means slight; proof that decedent
did not understand what he was doing when he took his life, or that he
acted under an uncontrollable impulse may often be difficult to obtain."
Added to this evidentiary obstacle to recovery is the ghost of the old
common law abhorrence of suicide which lingers yet today."1 Unlike the
negligent tortfeasor, however, whose purse is often put beyond the grasp
of the plaintiff by these barriers to recovery, the intentional tortfeasor is
liable if his conduct was a substantial factor1 2 in bringing about harm of
the general type which he intended.1 3 The fact that his" conduct causes
harm through an independent force for which he is not responsible, or
that the intervention of this new force was entirely- unexpected matters
not, if the tortious conduct is intentional.1 4
The instant case clearly sets forth the prevailing rule of law in this
area,15 yet the case differs from most others in that it allows recovery in
a situation where other tribunals have refused to do so. In vain did
the court attempt to find authority for the result it reached. Illustrative
183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 425 (1903) ; Cooper v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 102 Mass.
227 (1869); Long v. Omaha Ry., 108 Neb. 342, 187 N.W. 930 (1922); McMahon
v. City of N.Y., 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Arsnow v. Red Top Cab Co.,
159 Wash. 137, 292 Pac. 436 (1930).
5. Orcutt v. Spokane County, 364 P.2d 1102, 1110 (Wash. 1961).
6. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 455 (1934).
7. PROSSER, TORTS §49 (2d ed. 1955).
8. Zytkewich v. Ford Motor Co., 340 Mich. 309, 65 N.W.2d 813 (1954); Nohe
v. Sheffield Farms, 163 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Allen v. Industrial Comm'n,
110 Utah 328, 172 P.2d 669 (1946).
9. Hawthorne v. Blythewood, 118 Conn. 617, 174 Atl. 81 (1934); Murray v.
St. Mary's Hosp., 113 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Spivey v. St. Thomas Hosp.,
31 Tenn. App. 12, 211 S.W.2d 450 (1947).
10. Very often, a person attempting to recover in a situation like the present
one will encounter difficulty when seeking to obtain the testimony of psychiatrists
who often object to the way in which they are forced to present their opinion
testimony insofar as they are forced to restrict their answers to the questions
of counsel. Others do not like to be used as partisans, while still others rebel against
certain phraseology used in the courtroom. For example, some psychiatrists con-
tend that the phrase "irresistible impulse" has no reality in mental life. See Gutt-
macher, Why Psychiatrists Do Not Like To Testify In Court, 1 PRAc. LAw. 50
(1955). See note 20, infra.
11. At common law suicide was a crime. . . . the suicide is. guilty of a
double offense; one spiritual, in invading the prerogative of the Almighty, and rushing
into His immediate presence uncalled for; the other temporal, against the king, who
hath an interest in the preservation of all his subjects . . . making it a peculiar
species of felony ... committed on one's self." 4 BLACKSTONZ'S COMMENTARIES 189
(8th ed. 1778).
12. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 279, 280 (1934).
13. Id.
14. See note 12, supra.
15. See note 4, supra.
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of this difficulty is the previous Washington case of Arsnow v. Red
Top Cab Co.,16 which was relied upon by the court to a great extent for
the rule announced there. In Arsnow, a case factually similar to the
present one, the court expressly approved the rule applied in the instant
case, but significantly it held as a matter of law17 that sufficient evidence
had not been produced to establish that death was caused by the de-
fendant's negligence. The plaintiff in Arsnow, like the plaintiff in the
instant case, offered expert testimony to prove that the decedent was in-
sane at the time of his death. This expert opinion, however, was not
given the weight which the court in this case attached to it.28 In Daniels
v. N.Y. Ry. Co.'9 there was also expert testimony that the decedent was
insane at the time of his death, but the court, in denying recovery, was
evidently not as much impressed by such expertise as was the court
here.20 Perhaps the essential weakness of the instant case is the court's
failure to distinguish between an "impulse" and a "compulsion," the
former being a spontaneous involuntary tendency to action which cannot
be traced directly to external stimuli, while the latter is traceable to
some irresistible stimulus or suggestion, such as the obsession of decedent
to take her life.21 From the facts of the instant case, it appears that
decedent's suicide resulted from a compulsion of many months' duration,
rather than from a sudden impulse to commit suicide. Perhaps the
rule in the instant case should be stated so as to allow recovery where
suicide is caused by an uncontrollable "urge" or "drive" to take one's
life. This would avoid the distinction heretofore drawn by the courts
between "impulse" and "compulsion,"' ' but it would not overcome the
16. See note 4, supra. Decedent was injured by one of defendant's vehicles
and, after threatening several times to take his life, shot himself with a pistol which
he had been hiding under his pillow.
17. 159 Wash. 137, 292 Pac. 436, 444 (1930).
18. 364 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Wash. 1961).
19. See note 4, supra.
20. After "shopping around" for expert opinion favorable to their respective
positions, litigants then offer such expert opinion testimony to a jury often in-
competent to resolve conflict in the scientific opinions. See McCormick, Some Obser-
vations Upon The Opinion Rule And Expert Testimony, 23 Tzx. L. Rgv. 109 (1945).
The use of neutral court-appointed experts has been widely recommended to correct
this weakness. Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. Rxv. 40, 56 (1901); Morgan, Suggested Remedy for
Obstruction To Expert Testimony By Rules of Evidence, 10 U. CI. L. Rzv. 285,
293 (1943) ; Van Dusen, The Impartial Medical Expert System: The Judicial Point
of View, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 386 (1961). McCoxosicK, EvIDmNc, 35, 38 (1954). This
suggestion has, of course, been implemented in some jurisdictions, such as the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
21. WARREN, DICTIONARY Or PSYCHOLOGY (1934). On the validity of the dis-
tinction see also COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN Lirz 215 (2d ed.
1956).
22. Anderson v. Armour, 257 Minn. 281, 101 N.W.2d 435 (1960). Decedent
grabbed a knife and plunged it into a piece of meat. Shortly thereafter he was
found dead in his truck with his wrists slashed. In Blasczak v. Crown Cork, 193
Pa. Super. 422, 165 A.2d 128 (1960), which it should be noted arose under the Penn-
sylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, decedent's leg was amputated after an acci-
dent. His wife found him hanged. He left no note, nor had he ever given any
indication of suffering from melancholia. In both cases, plaintiffs recovered judg-
ments, relying on the uncontrollable impulse rule.
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